Motivated by uncertain parameters encountered in Markov decision processes (MDPs) and stochastic games, we study the effect of parameter uncertainty on Bellman operator-based algorithms under a set-based framework. Specifically, we first consider a family of MDPs where the cost parameters are in a given compact set; we then define a Bellman operator acting on a set of value functions to produce a new set of value functions as the output under all possible variations in the cost parameter. We prove the existence of a fixed point of this set-based Bellman operator by showing that it is contractive on a complete metric space, and explore its relationship with the corresponding family of MDPs and stochastic games. Additionally, we show that given interval set bounded cost parameters, we can form exact bounds on the set of optimal value functions. Finally, we utilize our results to bound the value function trajectory of a player in a stochastic game.
Introduction
Markov decision process (MDP) is a fundamental framework for control design in stochastic environments, reinforcement learning, and stochastic games [2, 3, 10, 14, 21] . Given cost and transition probabilities, solving an MDP is equivalent to minimizing an objective in expectation, and requires determining the optimal value function as well as deriving the corresponding optimal policy for each state. Relying on the fact that the optimal value function is the fixed point of the Bellman operator, dynamic programming methods iteratively apply variants of the Bellman operator to converge to the optimal value function and the optimal policy [27] .
We are motivated to study MDPs where the parameters that define the environment are sets rather than single valued. Such set-based perspective arises naturally in the analysis of parameter uncertain MDPs and stochastic games. In this paper, we develop a framework for evaluating MDPs on compact sets. Specifically, we show that when the cost parameter of the MDP is in a compact set rather than singlevalued, we can define a Bellman operator on the space of compact sets, such that it is contractive with respect to the Hausdorff distance. We prove the existence of a unique and compact fixed point set that the operator must converge to, and give interpretations of the fixed point set in the context of parameter uncertain MDPs and stochastic games. When modeling a system as a stochastic process, sampling techniques are often used to determine cost and transition probability parameters. In such scenarios, the MDP can be either interpreted as a standard MDP with error bounds on its parameters, or as a set-based MDP in which its parameters are sets rather than single-valued. In the former approach, an MDP can be solved with standard dynamic programming methods, and the stability of its solution with respect to the parameter perturbation can be analyzed locally [1, 4, 5] . However, these sensitivity results are only local approximations in the context of compact parameter sets. The latter approach is not well explored -some research exists on bounded interval set MDPs [16] , in which dynamic programming techniques such as value and policy iteration have been shown to converge. However, uncertain cost parameters may not always result in interval sets; another example of a bounded cost parameter set is a compact polytope. In this paper, we show that in general, given an MDP with a compact set cost parameter, it must have an associated Bellman operator whose a unique compact fixed point set contains the optimal value function of MDPs whose single-valued cost parameter belong to the given cost parameter set.
As opposed to parameter uncertain MDPs where the underlying cost and probability parameters are constant albeit uncertain, stochastic games result in MDPs where the cost and probability parameters vary with opponents' changing policies. An individual player can interpret a stochastic game as an MDP with a parameter-varying environment, and as a result, it does not commit to solving a fixed parameter MDP unless a Nash equilibrium is achieved. A Nash equilibrium defines an optimal joint policy for all players, at which no player has any incentive to change its policy. Since every player is performing optimally, each player's MDP parameters remain constant. In learning theory for stochastic games, players iteratively update their individual policies to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Many of the learning algorithms are based on variants of the Bellman operator with costs and probabilities changing at each iteration [6, 24] . In this paper, we do not focus on demonstrating convergence towards a Nash equilibrium. Instead, we specialize the set-based MDP framework to a single controller stochastic game, and show that the set of Nash equilibria must be contained in the fixed point set of a set-based Bellman operator.
In [22] , we initiated our analysis of set-based MDPs by proving the existence of a unique fixed point set to the set-based Bellman operator. In this paper, we demonstrate the significance of this fixed point set by relating it to the fixed points of parameter uncertain MDPs and the Nash equilibria set of stochastic games. We further explore the fixed point set in the context of iterative solutions to stochastic games, and show that the fixed point set of the set-based Bellman operator bounds the asymptotic behaviour of dynamic programmingbased learning algorithms.
The paper is structured as follows: we provide references to existing research in Section 2; we recall definition of an MDP and the Bellman operator in Section 3; Section 4 extends these definitions to set-based MDPs, providing theoretical results for the existence of a fixed point set of a setbased Bellman operator. Section 5 relates properties of the fixed point set to stochastic games. An interval set-based MDP is presented in Section 6 with a computation of exact bounds, while the application to stochastic games is illustrated in Section 7, where we model unknown policies of the opponent as cost intervals.
Related Research
Bounding the fixed point of the Bellman operator with uncertain parameters is well studied under robust MDPs such as in [9, 32] , where the value functions are bounded with a given probability when cost and transition probability parameters are Gaussian distributed. In contrast to our MDP model, the cost parameters under the Gaussian distribution assumption do not come from a compact set. Bounding MDPs with reachability objectives and uncertain transition probabilities is studied in [17] . However, the techniques utilized in [17] require abstraction of the MDP state space and therefore do not extend to value functions which are defined per state. Our work is perhaps closest to that of [16] , in which value iteration and policy iteration are shown to converge for an MDP whose cost and probability parameters are interval sets rather than the more general compact sets that we study. Finally, we note that a generalization of [16] is given in [28] , in which an algebraic abstraction to interval sets is used to analyze uncertain MDP parameters.
Introduced in [30] , stochastic game generalizes the notion of an optimal policy in MDP to a Nash equilibrium. Learning algorithms for computing the Nash equilibria can be categorized by the assumption of perfect vs imperfect information [15] . In this paper, our Nash equilibria analysis always assumes perfect information. The computation complexity of N player general sum stochastic games is shown to be NP hard in [7] , while value iteration for such games is shown to diverge in [20] . However, some Bellman operator-based algorithms will converge when constrained to two player stochastic games or zero sum stochastic games [11, 26, 30, 31] .
MDP and Bellman Operator
We introduce our notation for existing results in MDPs, which are used throughout the paper. Contents from this section are discussed in further detail in [27] .
Notation: Sets of N elements are given by [N ] = {0, . . . , N − 1}. We denote the set of matrices of i rows and j columns with real or non-negative valued entries as R i×j or R i×j + , respectively. Matrices and some integers are denoted by capital letters, X, while sets are denoted by cursive letters, X . The set of all compact subsets of X is denoted by H(X ). The column vector of ones is denoted by (5) γ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount factor.
At each time step t, the decision maker chooses an action a at its current state s. The state-action pair (s, a) induces a probability distribution vector over states [S] as [P 1,sa , P 2,sa , . . . , P S,sa ]. The state-action (s, a) also induces a cost C sa for the decision maker.
The decision maker chooses actions via a policy. We denote policy as a function π : R S × R A → [0, 1], where π(s, a) denotes the probability that action a is chosen at state s. We also denote in shorthand, π(s) ∈ [0, 1] A a probability vector over the action space at each state s. The set of all policies of an MDP is denoted by Π. Within Π, we consider a subset of deterministic policies Π d ⊂ Π, where a policy π is deterministic if at each state s, π(s, a) returns 1 for exactly one action, and 0 for all other possible actions. A policy π ∈ Π that is not deterministic is a mixed policy.
We denote the policy matrix induced by the policy π as M π ∈ R S×SA , where
Every policy induces a Markov chain [12] , given by
For an MDP ([S], [A], P, C, γ), we are interested in minimizing the discounted infinite horizon expected cost, defined with respect to a policy π as
where E π s (f ) is the discounted infinite horizon expected value of objective f , s t and a t are the state and action taken at time step t, and s is the initial state of the decision maker at t = 0. V s is the optimal value function for the initial state s. The policy π that achieves this optimal value is called an optimal policy. In general, the optimal value function V s is unique while the optimal policy π is not. The set of optimal policies always includes at least one deterministic stationary policy if there are no additional constraints [27, Thm 6.2.11] . If there are additional constraints on the policy and state space, deterministic policies may become infeasible [12] .
Bellman Operator
Determining the optimal value function of a given MDP is equivalent to solving for the fixed point of the associated Bellman operator, for which a myriad of techniques exists [27] . We introduce the Bellman operator and its fixed point here for the corresponding MDP problem.
Definition 1 (Bellman Operator) For a discounted infinite horizon MDP ([S], [A]
, P, C, γ), its Bellman operator f C :
The fixed point of the Bellman operator is a value function V ∈ R S that is invariant with respect to the operator.
In order to show that the Bellman operator has a unique fixed point, we consider the following operator properties.
Definition 3 (Order Preservation) Let X be a partially ordered space with partial order . An operator F : X → X is an order preserving operator iff
Definition 4 (Contraction) Let (X , d) be a complete metric space with metric d. An operator F : X → X is a contracting operator iff
The Bellman operator f C is known to have both properties on the complete metric space (R S , · ∞ ). Therefore, Banach fixed point theorem can be used to show that f C has a unique fixed point [27] . Because the optimal value function V is given by the unique fixed point of the associated Bellman operator f C , we use the terms optimal value function and fixed point of f C interchangeably.
In addition to obtaining V , MDPs are also solved to determine the optimal policy, π . Every policy π induces a unique stationary value function V given by
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product and γ ∈ (0, 1). Given a policy π, we can equivalently solve for the stationary value function V as V = (I − γM π P T ) −1 (M π (I A ⊗ 1 S )C T 1 S ). From this perspective, the optimal value function V is the minimum vector among the set of stationary value functions corresponding to the set of policies Π. Policy iteration algorithms utilize this fact to obtain the optimal value function V by iterating over the feasible policy space [27] .
Given the optimal value function V , we can also derive a deterministic optimal policy π from the Bellman operator as
where argmin a ∈[A] returns the first optimal action a if multiple actions minimize the expression C sa + γ s ∈[S] P s ,sa V s at state s. While the optimal policy does not need to be unique, deterministic or stationary, the optimal policy π derived from (6) will always be unique, deterministic and stationary.
Termination Criteria for Value Iteration
Among different algorithms that solve for the fixed point of the Bellman operator, value iteration (VI) is a commonly used and simple technique in which the Bellman operator is iteratively applied until the optimal value function is reached -i.e. starting from any value function V 0 ∈ R S , we apply
The iteration scheme given by (7) converges to the optimal value function of the corresponding discounted infinite horizon MDP. The following result presents a stopping criteria for (7) .
Lemma 5 [27, Thm. 6.3.1] For any initial value function V 0 ∈ R S , let {V k } k∈N satisfy the value iteration given by (7) .
Lemma 5 connects relative convergence of the sequence {V k } k∈N to absolute convergence towards V by showing that the former implies the latter. In general, the stopping criteria differ for different MDP objectives (see [17] for recent results on stopping criteria for MDPs with a reachability objective).
Set-based Bellman Operator
The classic Bellman operator with respect to a cost C is well studied. Motivated by parameter uncertain MDPs and stochastic games, we extend the classic Bellman operator by lifting it to operate on sets rather than individual value functions in R S . For the set-based operator, we analyze its setbased domain and prove relevant operator properties such as order preservation and contraction. Finally, we show the existence of a unique fixed point set V and relate its properties to the fixed point of the classic Bellman operator.
Set-based operator properties
For the domain of our set-based operator, we define a new
On the complete metric space H(R S ), we define a setbased Bellman operator which acts on compact sets. , P, C, γ), where C ⊂ R S×A is a non-empty compact set, its associated set-based Bellman operator is given by
where cl is the closure operator.
Since F C is the union of uncountably many bounded sets, the resulting set may not be bounded, and therefore it is not immediately obvious that F C (V) maps into the metric space H(R S ).
Proposition 8 If C is non-empty and compact, then
PROOF. For a non-empty compact subset A of a finite dimensional real vector space, we define its diameter as diam (A) = sup x,y∈A x − y ∞ . The diameter of a set in a metric space is finite if and only if it is bounded [29] .
Take any non-empty compact set V ∈ H(R S ). As F C (V) ⊆ R S , it suffices to prove that F C (V) is closed and bounded.
The closedness is guaranteed by the closure operator. A subset of a metric space is bounded iff its closure is bounded. Hence, to prove the boundedness, it suffices to prove that
We bound (10) by bounding the two terms on the right hand side separately. The second term satisfies
due to contraction properties of f C . To bound the first term, we note that for any two vectors a, b ∈ R S ,
where the operator max{} denote maximum element, and max(a) denote maximum component of vector a. Evaluating (11),
whereπ is an optimal policy corresponding to f C .
Since
Having established the space which F C operates on, we can draw many parallels between F C and f C . Similar to f C having a fixed point V in the real vector space, we consider whether a unique fixed point set V which satisfies F C (V ) = V exists. To take the comparison further, since V is optimal for an MDP problem defined by ([S], [A], P, C, γ), we consider if V correlates to the family of optimal value functions that correspond to the MDP family ([S], [A], P, C, γ). We explore these parallels in this paper, prove the existence of a unique fixed point V for the set-based Bellman operator F C , and derive sufficient conditions for its existence.
We prove the existence and uniqueness of V by utilizing the Banach fixed point theorem [27] , which states that a unique fixed point must exist for all contraction operators on complete metric spaces. First, we show that F C has properties given in Definitions 3 and 4 on the complete metric space
Proposition 9 For any V ∈ H(R S ) and C ⊂ R S×A closed and bounded, F C is an order preserving and a contracting operator in the Hausdorff distance.
We conclude that F C is order-preserving. To see that F C is contracting, we need to show
First we note that taking sup (inf) of a continuous function over the closure of a set A is equivalent to taking the sup (inf) over A itself. Furthermore,
where in (15b) we take the upper bound derived in Proposition (8) . In (15c) we haven chosen the matrix C = C to minimize (C − C ) T ∞ . This eliminates the cost term and we arrive at (15d).
Then (13) and (14) simplifies to
The contraction property of F C implies that any repeated application of the operator to a V 0 ∈ H(R S ) will result in closer consecutive sets in the Hausdorff distance. It is then natural to consider if there is a unique set which all F C (V k ) converges to.
Theorem 10 There exists a unique fixed point V of the setbased Bellman operator F C as defined in Definition 1, such that F C (V ) = V , and V is a closed and bounded set in
converges in the Haussdorf distance -i.e.,
PROOF. As shown in Proposition 9, F C is a contracting operator. From the Banach fixed point theorem [27, Thm 6.2.3], there exists a unique fixed point V , and any arbitrary
Properties of fixed point set
In the case of the Bellman operator f C on metric space R S , the fixed point V corresponds to the optimal value function of the MDP associated with cost C. Because there is no direct association of an MDP problem to the set of cost parameters C, we cannot claim the same for the set-based Bellman operator and V . However, V does have many interesting properties on H(R S ), especially in terms of setbased value iteration (16) .
We consider the following generalization of value iteration: suppose that instead of a fixed cost parameter, we have that at each iteration k, a C k that is randomly chosen from the compact set of cost parameters C. In general, lim k→∞ f C k (V k ) may not exist. However, we can infer from Theorem 10 that the sequence {V k } converges to the set V in the Hausdorff distance.
where V is the unique fixed point set of the operator F C .
PROOF. Define V 0 = {V 0 }, then from Definition 7 and Definition 1,
Proposition 11 implies that regardless of whether or not the sequence {f C k (V k )} k∈N converges, the sequence {V k } must asymptotically approach V . This has important interpretations in the game setting that is further explored in Section 5. On the other hand, Proposition 11 also implies that if lim k→∞ V k does converge, its limit point must be an element of V .
Corollary 12
We define the set of fixed points of f C for each
i.e., U is the set of optimal value functions for the set of MDPs ([S], [A], P, C, γ) where C ∈ C. Furthermore, we consider all sequences {C k } k∈N ⊆ C such that for V 0 ∈ R S , the iteration V k+1 = f C k (V k ) approaches a limit point V = lim k→∞ V k , and define the set of all such limit points as
then U ⊆ W ⊆ V .
PROOF. For any
follows from Proposition 11. Therefore,
From the fact that the infimum over a compact set is always achieved for an element of the set [29] , V ∈ V . Therefore W ⊆ V . To see that U ⊆ W, take C k = C for all k = 0, 1, . . ., then U ⊆ W. 2
Remark 13
We make the distinction between V , W, and U to emphasize that V is not simply the set of fixed points corresponding to f C for all possible C ∈ C, given by U, or the limit points of f C k for all possible sequences {C k } k∈N ⊂ C, given by W. The fixed point set V contains all possible limiting trajectories of {f C k (V k )} k∈N without assuming a limit point exists.
In Corollary 12, U can be easily understood as the set of optimal value functions for the set of standard MDPs ([S], [A], P, C, γ) generated by C ∈ C. An interpretation for W is perhaps less obvious. We show in Section 7 that W corresponds to the set of limit points that result from the best response dynamics of a two player single controller stochastic game, as defined in the Section 5.
We summarize our results on set-based Bellman operator as the following: given a compact set of cost parameters C, F C converges to to a unique compact set V . The set V contains all the fixed points of f C for C ∈ C. Furthermore, V also contains the limit points of f C k (V k ) for any {C k } k∈N ⊆ C, V 0 ∈ R S , given that lim k→∞ V k converges. Even if the limit does not exist, V k must asymptotically converge to V in the Hausdorff distance.
Stochastic Games
In this section, we further elaborate on the properties of the fixed point set V in the context of stochastic games, and show that with an appropriate over-approximation of the Nash equilibria cost parameters, V contains the optimal value functions for player one at Nash equilibria.
A stochastic game extends a standard MDP to a multi-agent competitive setting [30] . We specifically focus on games with two players. As opposed to standard MDPs, the cost and and transition probabilities C and P for each player depends on the joint policy, π = (π 1 , π 2 ), where π 1 and π 2 are respectively player one and player two's policies as defined for standard MDPs in Section 3. The set of joint policies is given by Π, and the set of policies for player one and player two is given by Π 1 and Π 2 , respectively. We denote the actions of player one by a and the actions of player two by b. The transition kernel of the game is determined by the tensor Q ∈ R S×S×A×A , where Q satisfies
. Each player's cost D i ∈ R S×A×A also depends on the joint policy, where D 1 sab and D 2 sab denote player one and player two's cost when the joint action (a, b) is taken from state s, respectively. With the same notation of Section 3, we denote the transition kernel for player one when player two applies policy π 2 as P 1 (π 2 ), where
Similarly, let the cost of player one be denoted as
when player two takes on policy π 2 . Player two's cost C 2 (π 1 ) and transition kernel P 2 (π 1 ) can be similarly defined. Each player then solves a discounted MDP given by ([S], [A], P i (π j ), C i (π j ), γ i ). Since each player only controls part of the joint action space, the generalization to joint action space introduces non-stationarity in the transition and cost, when viewed from the perspective of an individual player solving an MDP.
We assume that both players have perfect informationi.e. both players can fully observe the joint policy as well as predict future states' probability distributions.
Given a joint policy (π 1 , π 2 ), each player attempts to minimize its value function. Each player's optimal discounted infinite horizon expected cost is given by
As formulated by (20) , we denote the value function of player one by V ∈ R S and the value function of player two by W ∈ R S . Given a joint policy π, both players have unique stationary value functions V (π 1 , π 2 ), W (π 1 , π 2 ) given by
Since a stochastic game can be viewed as coupled MDPs, the MDP notion of optimality must be expanded to reflect dependency of a player's individual optimal policy on the joint policy space. We define a Nash equilibrium in terms of each player's value function [14, Sec.3.1].
Definition 14 [Two Player
Nash Equilibrium] A joint policy π = (π 1 , π 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium if the corresponding value functions as given by (21) satisfy V (π 1 , π 2 ) ≤ V (π 1 , π 2 ), ∀ π 1 ∈ Π 1 , W (π 1 , π 2 ) ≤ W (π 1 , π 2 ), ∀ π 2 ∈ Π 2 . We denote the Nash equilibrium value functions as V = V (π 1 , π 2 ), W = W (π 1 , π 2 ) and the set of Nash equilibria for a stochastic game as Π N E ⊂ Π.
Definition 14 implies that a Nash equilibrium is achieved when the joint policy simultaneously generates value functions V and W which are the fixed points of the Bellman operator with respect to parameters C 1 (π 2 ), P 1 (π 2 ) and C 2 (π 1 ), P 2 (π 1 ) , respectively -i.e. V =
Nash equilibria are not unique in the general sum case. Furthermore, Π N E Π d , i.e. Nash equilibria policies are not composed of deterministic individual policies. Therefore while each player's Nash equilibrium value function is always the fixed point of the associated Bellman operator, the Nash equilibrium policy for each player is not the optimal deterministic policy associated to the Nash equilibrium value function in general. The existence of at least one Nash equilibrium for any general sum stochastic game is given in [14] . When the stochastic game is also zero sum, the Nash equilibrium is also unique.
In this paper, we focus on non-stationarity in the cost term only and leave non-stationary in the probability kernel term to future analysis. Specifically, we constrain our analysis to a single controller game [14, 13] , i.e. when the probability transition kernel is controlled by player one only.
Definition 15 (Single controller game) A single controller game is a two player stochastic game where the probability transition kernel is independent of player two's actions, i.e., for each (s , s, a)
i.e. P 1 (π 2 ) = P 2 (π 1 ) = P , ∀ π 1 ∈ Π 1 , π 2 ∈ Π 2 .
Although both players are still optimizing their value functions in a single controller game, player two's policy only affects its immediate cost at each state, while its transition dynamics become a time-varying Markov chain. However, π 2 still affects player one's MDP through cost matrix C 1 (π 2 ).
We analyze a single controller game from the set-based MDP perspective by utilizing Proposition 11. Suppose we are given a compact set C ⊂ R S×A that over-approximates the set of C N E -i.e. cost parameters that player one observes at Nash equilibria,
Then we show that the Nash equilibria value functions belong to the fixed point set of F C .
A valid over-approximation to C N E can always be easily found -the simplest being the interval set of all feasible costs.
Example 16 (Interval set approximation) An approximation to C N E can always be given by interval sets. At each state-action pair (s, a), the MDP cost parameter for player one is given by (19) . Then we can take the maximum and minimum elements of the set {C 1 sab } b∈[A] for all state actions pairs (s, a) to form an interval set C = C 11 × . . . × C SA ∈ H(R) S×A , such that
where C sa = min b∈[A] C 1 sab and C sa = max b∈[A] C 1 sab can be directly observed. In this case, C is an exact representation of player one's feasible cost parameters -i.e. every element C ∈ C corresponds to a policy π 2 , such that C = C 1 (π 2 ).
Interval sets will always give an admissible approximation, however more general sets such as polytopes allow additional information about Nash equilibria to be incorporated into the fixed point set. Suppose we know that at all Nash equilibria of a given game, the cost parameter at each state satisfies a∈[A] G sa C 1 sa (π 2 ) ≤ h s for constants G sa and h s , then a better approximation set is given by the polytope C ∩ G, where C is the interval set in Example 16, and G is given by
Given a compact set C that over-approximates the set of player one's cost parameters at Nash equilibria, C N E , we now show that the Nash equilibria value functions for player one must lie within V , the fixed point set of F C .
Theorem 17
In a single controller game, let C ⊂ R S×A be an over approximation of Nash equilibria costs for player one as in (22) . If C is compact, then the set of stationary value functions for player one at Nash equilibria policies (21) is a subset of V , the fixed point set of F C .
PROOF.
We define the set of Nash equilibria value functions for player one as
where the Bellman operator f C 1 (π 2 ) is defined with P , the π 2 independent transition kernel for both players. For any V ∈ V N E , there exists C = C 1 (π 2 ) ∈ C such that V is the fixed point of f C . Then from Corollary 12, V ∈ V . 2
Remark 18
Although the Nash equilibrium value function V is always the unique fixed point of f C given by (3), where C is player one's cost at Nash equilibrium, we note that in general, player one's policy at Nash equilibrium is not the optimal deterministic policy of f C (V ) given by (6); this is because Nash equilibrium is in general not composed of deterministic individual policies, while the solution to (6) is always deterministic.
However, if we consider the set of all deterministic policies that solves (6), then player one's policy at Nash equilibrium must be a convex combination within this set [14] .
We summarize the application of set-based MDP framework to single controller stochastic games as the following: when C over-approximates the set of costs at Nash equilibria, the fixed point set V of operator F C contains all of the Nash equilibria value functions for player one in a single controller stochastic game.
Application to Interval Set-Based Bellman Operator
In this section, we show that when the cost parameter set C and the initial value function set V 0 are interval sets, the fixed point set V of F C is also an interval set, as done similarly in [16] . However, their convergence is shown under an unconventional partial ordering. Leveraging our set-based Bellman operator framework and the Hausdorff distance as our metric, our result is derived in a much more straightforward manner using interval arithmetics.
As shown in Example 16, one over-approximation of the set of Nash equilibria costs is given by interval sets. In this section we show how to compute the fixed point set V of an interval set-based Bellman operator. Suppose the set C is given by
and the input value function set is given by
Hausdorff distance between interval sets
We first show that the Hausdorff distance between two interval sets V, V ∈ H(R S ) can be computed by only comparing the upper and lower bounds of the interval themselves.
Lemma 19
For two intervals X , Y ∈ H(R S , · ∞ ) given by X = [x, x], Y = [y, y], where x, x, y, y ∈ R S , the Hausdorff distance between X and Y can be calculated as
PROOF. We consider the component-wise Hausdorff distance by noting that when coupled with the infinity norm on R S , the Hausdorff distance satisfies
We
Recall that the infinity norm can be written using max operators given in (11) . The nested max representation of the infinity norm allows us to directly evaluate the infimum and suprenum of x i − y i ∞ over X i and Y i respectively, as
Similarly, we can derive
Finally we recall the definition of Hausdorff distance:
Then the total Hausdorff distance between X and Y is given by
Lemma 19 shows that interval sets are nice in that its Hausdorff distance can be derived via component-wise operations on the boundaries of the interval. We use Lemma 19 later in this section to obtain convergence guarantees of set-based value iteration to the fixed point set of the interval set-based Bellman operator.
Interval arithmetics
To compute the fixed point of an interval set-based Bellman operator, we introduce some relevant interval arithmetic operators [25] .
where the last operator min{[a, b], [c, d]} denotes the smallest interval that contains {min{x, y},
The equivalence relationship for the min operator is not as obvious as the standard addition and subtraction operators.
Here we prove that the equivalence for min operator is indeed as given. If v / ∈ [a, b], then either a = min{a, c} or b = min{b, d}. This is equivalent to either
With Lemma 19 and 20, we can analytically compute the fixed point set of an interval set-based Bellman operator and give convergence guarantees of interval set-based value iteration.
Proposition 21
For interval sets C and V given by (24) and (25) , respectively, F C (V) defined in Definition 7 is an interval set that satisfies
Furthermore, the sequence {V k } k∈N generated by the iteration V k+1 = F C (V k ) starting from any interval set V 0 will converge to V in Hausdorff distance: for every > 0, there exists V k which satisfies
where
PROOF. We recall the set-based Bellman operator Definition 7 and the component-wise definition of f C in Definition 1. Using these definitions and the fact that C = [C, C] and V = [V , V ] are both interval sets, the set-based Bellman operator can be written as
The union over interval sets can be written using interval arithmetic notation as
Since interval sets are closed by definition, the closure of (30) must also equal (31) . Therefore, F C (V) can be equivalently written component-wise as 
where (33b) utilizes the interval set-based minimization derived in Lemma 20, and (33c) follows from Definition 1.
The image of F C is another closed interval, as shown by (33c). From Theorem 10, any interval set
V and V are the fixed points of f C and f C , respectively.
At each iteration, the Hausdorff distance between V k and V is given by
We note that while V k converges to V in Hausdorff distance, it is not an over approximation to V . In fact, if V k > V for some k ∈ N, then each V V k for all k. Nonetheless, we can still utilize V k to obtain an over-approximation of V by
Numerical Example
Our analysis of set-based Bellman operator is motivated by dynamic programming-based learning algorithms in stochastic games. In this section, we apply interval set-based value iteration analyze dynamic programming-based learning algorithms in a two player single controller stochastic game, and show that both transient and asymptotic behaviours of player one's value function can be bounded, regardless of the opponent's learning algorithm.
We consider a two player single controller stochastic game as defined in Definition 15, where each player solves a discounted MDP given by ([S], [A], P, C 1,2 , γ 1,2 ). Both players share an identical state-action space ([S], [A]) as well as the same transition probabilities P controlled by player one's actions. Player one's costs are given by
while player two's cost is given by
where the matrix A ∈ R (S×A) + is the same for the two costs.
Although convergent algorithms exist for such single controller games [23, 19] , if the players cannot coordinate which algorithm to use between themselves, convergence towards a Nash equilibrium cannot be guaranteed. In this section, we utilize our set-based Bellman operator to show that, although we cannot guarantee convergence of player one's value function to a Nash equilibrium value function, we can instead determine the bounded value function set that player one's value function converges to, independent of the opponent's learning algorithm.
We define the state space of a stochastic game on a 3 × 3 grid, shown in Figure 1a . The set of neighbouring states of s, N s , consists of states immediately connected to s by a green arrow in Figure 1a . Furthermore, let N s denote the number of elements in N s . From each state s, the actions available are labelled 'left', 'right', 'up', or 'down', as shown in Figure 1b . Each state s has actions 'left', 'right', 'up', and 'down' with a corresponding target state in the direction of the action. If the action is feasible, i.e. from state s, it coincides with a green arrow in Figure 1a , then its probability distribution is defined as
If action a is infeasible, i.e. from state s, it coincides with a yellow arrow, then its probability distribution is defined as
We initialize the matrix C as a random matrix, such that each entry C sa is sampled with uniform probability from [0, 1]. Similarly, the matrix A is also randomly initialized such that each A sa ∈ [0, 0.1]. This allows us to derive an interval set-based cost parameter C given by
The upper bound C sa + A sa is achieved when player two's probability of taking action a from state s is 1. We use C to represent the set of cost parameters for player one for all of player two's policies.
We consider a two player value iteration algorithm presented in Algorithm 1 which forms the basis of many dynamic programming-based learning algorithms for stochastic games [14, 23] . At each time step, player one takes the optimal policy (6) that solves the Bellman operator f C (V k ), where C is the last time step's cost parameter and V k is last time step's value function -i.e. player one performs value iteration at every time step. Player two obtains its optimal policy using function g : Π 1 → Π 2 , we do not make any assumptions of g, it may produce any policy π 2 in response to the policy π 1 .
Algorithm 1 Two player VI
Our analysis provides bounds on player one's value function when we do not know how player two is updating its policy -i.e. when g is unknown. In simulation, we take g to be different strategies and show that player one's value functions are bounded by the interval set analysis and converges towards the fixed point set of the corresponding Bellman operator.
Suppose both players are updating their policies via value iteration (6) . Player one performs value iteration with a discount factor of γ 1 = 0.7, while player two performs value iteration with an unknown discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1). Assuming both players' value functions are initialized to be 0 in every state, we simulate player one's value function trajectories for different values of γ in Figure 2 . Figure 2 shows that when player two utilizes different discount factors, player two experiences different trajectories despite the fact that both players are utilizing value iteration to minimize their losses. However, the value function trajectory that player one follows is always bounded between the thresholds we derived from Proposition 11. As Figure 2 shows, there does not seem to be any direct correlation between player two's discount factor and player one's value function. However, the interval bounds we derived do tightly approximate resulting value function trajectories.
Alternatively, suppose we know that player two has the same discount factor as player one, but we do not know player two's initial value function or if it is minimizing or maximizing its discounted objective. We analyze both scenarios: when player two is also minimizing its cost and when player two is maximizing its cost. In Figure 3 , the infinity norm of player one's value function at each iteration k is shown with respect to these two scenarios. Both player one and player two's initial value function is randomly initialized as V 0 s ∈ [0, 1], ∀ s ∈ [S]. Figure 3 only plots player one's value function: the dotted trajectories are when player two is minimizing its own value function and the solid trajectories are when player two is maximizing its own value function. The grey region shows the predicted bounds as derived from Proposition 11. As Figure 3 shows, player two's policy change causes a significant shift in player one's value function trajectory. When the opponent player is attempting to maximize its own cost parameter, player one's function achieves the absolute lower bound as predicted by Proposition 21. This is due to the fact that at least four actions with different costs are available at each state. Since both players are selecting from the set of deterministic policies Π d , they are bound to select different actions unless all actions have the exact same cost. On the contrary, if player two is also attempting to minimize its value function, then both players would precisely select the same state-actions at every time step. Then depending on the coupling coefficient A sa , they may or may not choose a less costly action at the next step. This causes both the limit cycle behaviour that the dotted trajectories displace. In terms of the tightness of the bounds we derived in Proposition 11, we note that Figure 3 also shows the existence of trajectories which approach both the upper and lower bounds, therefore in practice the set-based bounds are shown to be tight.
Conclusion
We've bounded the set of optimal value functions of the set-based Bellman operator associated with a discounted infinite horizon MDP. Our results are motivated by bounding optimal value functions of parameter uncertain MDPs and value functions trajectories of a player in a stochastic games. We demonstrate our example on a grid MDP and show that while player one's value functions do not converge, they converge to the fixed point set of the set-based Bellman operator in Hausdorff distance. Future work include extending the set-based analysis to consider uncertainty in the transition kernels to fully bound value function trajectories of learning algorithms in a general stochastic game.
